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I. INTRODUCTION
Sixty citizens have been thrown into prison and the business
of punishing them is to begin to-morrow. This province sets
a fine example to the others, teaching them above all things
to respect their governors and gouvernantes, and not to
throw any more stones into their garden. 1
When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his observations of nineteenth
century American society, he repeatedly focused on the ways in which
social equality shaped governance and civic institutions in the erstwhile
British colonies. Tocqueville-himself no stranger to contemporary
penology--opined that "[i]n no country is criminal justice administered
with more mildness than in the United States."'3 In contrast, European
justice is described as heavily influenced by the feudal system of the
Middle Ages, where the ruling classes "cannot... thoroughly understand
what others feel" due to the hierarchical social structure of the time.4 To
illustrate his point, Tocqueville quoted Madame de Svign6's dispassionate
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1. Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, Madame de Sdvignd (1675), quoted in 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 201 (Henry Reeve, trans., 1862).
2. See G. DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (Fancis Liber, trans. & ed., 1833).
3. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 203.
4. Id. at 199.
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descriptions of "the business of punishing,"'5 the scattering of severed limbs
about the city, and the regular use of capital punishment "just to keep up
appearances." '6
Tocqueville was writing at the same time that American prisons were
enjoying their first period of popular support.7 Cognizant of the apathy
with which European aristocracy oversaw brutal systems of capital
punishment, democratic reformers of the Jacksonian Era championed
penitentiaries as an enlightened alternative. 8 Instead of responding to crime
by inflicting physical injury, the penitentiary would "rehabilitate" errants
and return them to productive roles in society.9 Throughout American
history, the ideal of prisons as rehabilitative institutions has waxed and
waned, counterbalanced by periods in which public policy has focused on
punishment and retribution as the ultimate goal of incarceration. 10
Today, the dispassionate lack of empathy that Tocqueville used to define
European sensibilities has resurfaced in a new trend in American
corrections: the use of for-profit, contractor-operated prisons. While
retaining nominal public oversight of correctional facilities, prison
privatization effectively shrouds prison operations in a veil of secrecy.11
Prisons, whether publicly or privately operated, have a long history of
hiding operational shortcomings by invoking the mantle of facility security
concerns. 12 Private prisons, however, have proven quite adept at using an
additional layer of corporate security protections (e.g., trade secret law) to
prevent public oversight of contract facilities.13
5. Id. at 201. Henry Reeve, who translated Democracy in America into English for the 1862 edition,
translated Sdvignd's phrase as "the business of punishing." Id. Modem translators have typically used
the more direct phrase "the business of hanging," which is more historically precise (since Sdvignd was
certainly referring to capital punishment) and may be linguistically accurate as well. See 3 ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA DtMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE 277 (Calmann Ldvy ed., 1888) (using original French
"et on commence demain A pendre").
6. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
7. David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789 1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 100, 100 (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman eds., 1998) [hereinafter Perfecting the Prison].
8. Id. at 105.
9. Id. at 106.
10. See, e.g., REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941, at 3-4 (2008).
11. Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential
Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 111, 140 (2001).
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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Although prisoners theoretically enjoy enhanced legal protections
established after decades of civil rights litigation, 14 enforcing those rights
against secretive and largely unaccountable contractors is exceedingly
difficult. The use of contractual relationships to shield correctional
shortcomings from public view echoes the lack of inter-caste empathy that
preoccupied Tocqueville. Although American public opinion about
prisoners fluctuates (generally changing in proportion to public fear of
crime), the opaque operations of private prisons prevent citizens and even
policy-makers from having to confront many injustices that occur within
prison walls.15 Prisoners housed in private facilities frequently broadcast
their grievances to the outside world, but most inmates suffer from a lack of
credibility, particularly when speaking about conditions of confinement. 16
Attorneys, prisoner advocates, and policy experts who wish to compile an
evidence-based picture of private prison operations are typically left with
little useful information.17 Instead, oversight is left to the contracting
government agency-an inadequate solution since agencies, which depend
on privately-owned capacity to ensure adequate space of an entire prison
system, will rarely risk disrupting a relationship with a critical vendor. 18
To understand the contemporary use of contractor-operated prisons, one
must appreciate the political and economic developments which allowed
privatization to enter the corrections industry. Accordingly, this article
starts with a brief history of privatized corrections in the United States. The
following section explores how the modem marketplace for private prisons
has been shaped by two prominent dynamics-the emergence of a national
market for prison beds and the massive expansion of the nation's immigrant
detention system. The paper then considers the general implications of
non-governmental prison operation, with a focus on how contractors have
exploited their private status to the detriment of inmates, taxpayers, and
contracting agencies.
Over the past two decades, researchers, correctional professionals, and
policy-makers have devoted substantial time to debating the efficacy of
prison privatization-both in terms of operational success and cost
savings. 19 Such debates usually presuppose that the participants' arguments
14. But see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the erosion of prisoner civil rights law
in the 1980s and 1990s).
15. White, supra note 11, at 139.
16. Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to Democracy, 11 GEo. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 249, 269 (2004).
17. See id. at 272-74.
18. CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 194 (1990).
19. See White, supra note 11, at 135.
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are based on reliable data concerning private prisons' record. 20  As
discussed in this article, private prison operators have prevented the
adequate dissemination of information to support their claims of success;
however, because of the general public lack of interest in the details of
prison operations, such information asymmetry has generally gone
unnoticed.21
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PRIVATIZED PRISONS IN THE UNITED
STATES
The birth of the American prison system is a notorious paradox. In the
words of historian David Rothman, "[i]n the 1820s and 1830s, when
democratic principles were receiving their most enthusiastic endorsement,
when the 'common people' were participating fully in politics and electing
Andrew Jackson their president, incarceration became the central feature of
criminal justice. '22 Prisons were part of a uniquely American rejection of
British social control mechanisms. 23 As a general matter, British and early
colonial responses to dependent and deviant populations (i.e., the poor, the
criminal, the insane, and the orphaned) were disorganized, harsh, and
heavily influenced by religious doctrines.24 Prisons were one component of
a broad-based reform movement that originated in the late eighteenth
century and flourished in the early to middle nineteenth century. 25
Governments assumed responsibility for the operation of various charitable
institutions designed to cure deviant behavior-institutions such as
asylums, reformatories, penitentiaries, and orphanages. 26
The initial use of incarceration in America was a novel alternative to
British criminal sentencing schemes, which relied heavily on corporal and
capital punishment.27 But Americans quickly became dissatisfied with
prisons, seeing them as breeding grounds for criminal behavior.28 The
Jacksonian Era rebirth of the penitentiary (and the concomitant renaissance
of other charitable institutions such as the asylum) sought to reclaim prisons
as rehabilitative institutions.29 In what was gradually becoming a familiar
20. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part lI.B.
22. Perfecting the Prison, supra note 7.
23. Id. at 102-04.
24. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 1- 14 (1971) [hereinafter THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM].
25. Perfecting the Prison, supra note 7, at 102-04.
26. See THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, supra note 24, at 30-154.
27. Id. at 59; Perfecting the Prison, supra note 7, at 102-03.
28. Perfecting the Prison, supra note 7, at 103-04.
29. Id. at 106 ("[T]he reformers hoped that the solutions that they devised to prison design problems
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cycle, the Jacksonian reform movement also ended in broad disillusion as
prisons once again became warehouses of cruelty and inefficiency. 30 This
time, however, the reformers had laid the foundation for a major systemic
change through the penitentiary's enhanced emphasis on convict labor.31
Pioneered by penal reformers in New York, some American prisons in the
mid-nineteenth century began providing inmate labor, for a fee, to private
business firms.32  Early contract labor arrangements typically entailed
multiple private firms contracting for prison labor, with inmates working in
prison workshops manufacturing goods which were then sold by the
contracting firms.33
After the Civil War, the system of convict labor took a decided turn in
favor of increased private control of prisoners, particularly under the
"convict leasing" system employed in southern states. Many southern
states restricted or even abolished contract prison labor during
Reconstruction, but the economic depression of the 1870s resulted in states
looking to cut prison costs and businesses looking for cheap labor. 34 When
"redeemer" Democratic governors began ending Reconstruction in the
southern states, many prisons began leasing large numbers of inmates to
private industries.35 This iteration of inmate labor differed from earlier
models in two notable regards. First, the scale was much larger-in some
states, two or three companies would effectively lease all available prison
labor.36 Second, companies typically assumed de facto custody of leased
convicts. 37 Although some politicians and social reformers were disturbed
by the extremely harsh conditions that inmates endured under convict
leasing arrangements, the ultimate demise of the system was due to
economic concerns. 38 As organized labor became more powerful, unions
set their sights on abolishing private firms' use of convict labor, citing the
inequity of making free-world laborers compete with the low-cost and
easily exploited pool of inmate workers.39 The battle was long and
would be relevant to the wider society. With no ironies intended, they talked about the penitentiary as
serving as a model for the family and the school. The prison was nothing less than 'a grand theatre for
the trial of all new plans in hygiene and education."').
30. Id. at 107-14.
31. See id. at 105.
32. See MCLENNAN, supra note 10, at 53.
33. Id. at 53-86.
34. Id. at 101.
35. Id. at 101-02.
36. Id. at 102.
37. White, supra note 11, at 127.
38. See id. at 133.
39. Cf id. at 133.
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complicated, but ultimately, the convict leasing system was abolished
during the 1880s and 1890s, with the last vestiges disappearing in the early
twentieth century.40
The role of private contractors in the corrections system did not
completely disappear after the end of the convict lease system. Most
notably, private (often not-for-profit) entities have long been used to
operate juvenile facilities and community-based corrections programs, such
as halfway houses. 41 But generally, the use of prisoners as commodities in
profit-making industries disappeared in twentieth century American
corrections-until the 1980s.42 The modem advent of privately operated
adult secure facilities came in 1979 when the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") "began contracting with private firms to
detain illegal immigrants pending hearings or deportation... .' 43  In the
1980s, the INS issued a contract to Wackenhut, an international security
firm, for the operation of an immigrant detention facility near Denver,
Colorado. 44  The Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA")
incorporated in 1983 and began operations under its first contract the next
year in Houston, Texas. 45 From its inception, the private prison market has
always been thin, with two dominant firms-CCA and Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation.46  Wackenhut started as a subsidiary of the
Wackenhut Corporation and is now an independent entity, recently renamed
"The GEO Group."47  Over the years, many smaller firms have been
acquired by CCA and Wackenhut. 48 In 1998 (after much consolidation had
already occurred), there were twelve private prison companies operating in
the United States, with CCA and Wackenhut controlling a combined
seventy-six percent of the total domestic private bed capacity.49 Of the
twelve companies listed in the 1998 census of private facilities, at least
three have subsequently been acquired by larger firms. 50
40. MCLENNAN, supra note 10, at 137-92.
41. DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT Assocs. INC., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 4-5 (1998).
42. White, supra note 11, at 134.
43. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. White, supra note 11, at 134.
47. See The Geo Group, Inc., Historic Milestones, http://www.geogroupinc.com/history.asp (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
48. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 19.
49. JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON
PRIVATIZED PRISONS 4 tbl.3 (2001) (showing that CCA and Wackenhut controlled 51.4% and 25.1% of
the market, respectively).
50. CiviGenics, Inc. was acquired by Community Education Centers in 2007. Community Education
Centers Acquires CiviGenics Creating the Nation's Largest Provider of Offender Reentry Services,
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The growth of the industry during the 1980s and early 1990s can best be
described as a perfect storm, involving three interrelated policy dynamics. 1
First, changes in sentencing policy ensured an unrelenting increase in prison
populations, necessitating new facility construction.5 2  Second,
unconstitutional conditions within state prison systems led to judicial
mandates to alleviate overcrowding-a challenge most states responded to
by building more prisons. 53 Third, the increasing political clout of the fiscal
conservatism movement made paying for prison expansion more difficult.54
Late twentieth century sentencing changes (the first factor of the perfect
storm) prioritized incarceration as the preferred response to crime. Fueled
by misinformation and sensational media portrayals of crime, voters in the
1980s became fixated on lengthy prison sentences for convicted offenders,
providing vote-seeking legislators an incentive to advocate for longer
sentences. 55  Culminating in Lee Atwater's fear-based Willie Horton
campaign during the 1988 presidential election, public opinion increasingly
reflected insecurity about personal safety and a belief that imprisonment
was the most effective solution.5 6 In addition to public anxiety about crime
in general, drug policy increasingly occupied center stage in criminal justice
policy debates, with federal and state lawmakers in a seeming competition
to craft the harshest drug sentencing regime. 57 By 2003, drug offenders
constituted twenty percent of state prisoners and fifty-five percent of the
INSIDE CEC (Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., West Caldwell, N.J.), Spring 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.cecintl.com/UploadedFiles/86997 CECnwsltr.pdf. Correctional Services Corporation was
acquired by GEOlWackenhut in 2005. GEO Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 17,
2006). Correctional Systems, Inc. was acquired by Cornell Companies in 2005. Cornell Companies,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 33 (Mar. 16, 2006).
51. Cf JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 98 (2d ed. 1995) ("Crises,
disasters, symbols, and other focusing events only rarely carry a subject to policy agenda prominence by
themselves. They need to be accompanied by something else .... [Or, quoting a case-study interview
subject,] 'A fortuitous catalyst [is often] thrown into an existing environment."'). Although no author
has concatenated detailed state-level case studies of this policy process in the context of prison
privatization, some isolated discussions do exist. See generally C. Elaine Cummins, Private Prisons in
Texas, 1987-2000: The Legal, Economic, and Political Influences on Policy Implementation (Oct. 25,
2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University) (on file with American University
Library); Stephen Raher, Walls of Stone, Bars of Gold: A Politico-Economic History of Colorado's
Prisons (Nov. 2002) (unpublished paper, University of Colorado Graduate School of Public Affairs) (on
file with author).
52. McDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: How THE WILLIE
HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995).
57. See EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 134-50 (1996).
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federal prison population, representing a twelve- and seventeen-fold
increase, respectively, since 1980. 58 All told, this period of tough-on-crime
politics saw the nation's total prison population increase from 319,598 in
1980 to 1.4 million in mid-2003-an increase of 334 percent.5 9
The second contributing factor to the rise of the modem private prison
industry is a direct result of the first. More stringent sentencing policy
predictably led to a higher prison population; however, this population
increase was not accompanied by adequate expansion of the nation's
carceral infrastructure. 60 Not surprisingly, this resulted in overcrowding
and substandard prison conditions. 61 While deplorable prison conditions
had been tolerated throughout the nation's history, states could not ignore
such problems in the 1980s and 1990s, due to the birth of prisoners' rights
litigation in the 1960s and 1970s. 62 Due to a more robust judicial approach
to vindicating prisoners' constitutional rights, more prison systems found
themselves under court supervision.63  So pronounced was the
overcrowding and resultant litigation that by mid-1988, the corrections
systems of thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and two territories
were operating under court orders to remedy unconstitutional conditions. 64
These judicial pressures made lawmakers much more susceptible to private-
sector promises of quick and cheap prison construction and operation. 65
Ironically, after the private sector reaped the benefit of the states' need to
rapidly expand their carceral capacity, private operators received a windfall
from the Supreme Court and Congress. First, after judicially crafted
remedies created the need for a massive prison-building campaign, the
United States Supreme Court substantially curtailed the ability of judges to
impose reforms on correctional systems, adopting a substantially deferential
constitutional standard in Turner v. Safley.66 Eight years after Turner,
58. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR
ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 9-10 (2007), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf
59. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2003, at 478
tbl.6.1 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2005).
60. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:4 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the
demise of the constitutional common-law "hands-off doctrine" during the 1960s and 1970s, culminating
in the United States Supreme Court cases Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) and Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)).
63. Id.
64. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
65. Id.
66. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 ("[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.").
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Congress went several steps further and enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA"), placing numerous procedural restraints on prisoner
lawsuits. 67 The ultimate result of Turner and the PLRA is to lessen the
likelihood that prisoners will prevail on civil rights claims, 68 a dynamic that
benefits the private prison industry by reducing litigation costs and avoiding
court-ordered remedies. Despite the change in the legal landscape, the
initial period of vigorous judicial vindication of prisoners' rights created a
policy window that opened long enough for the private prison industry to
establish itself.69 Once companies could show an operating track record
(even a checkered one), pitching new contracts to policy-makers became
easier. Even though Turner and the PLRA provide legal cover for prison
operators (both private and governmental), private operators were dealt a
small setback when the United States Supreme Court held that contractors
are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense in section 1983 suits. 70
The third and final factor that catalyzed the industry is the maturation of
the fiscal conservatism movement that began in the 1970s. As fiscal
conservatives claimed policy victories on the national level, states were
expected to take on increased responsibilities.71 But at the same time
federal responsibilities were devolving to the states, citizens demanded
protection from state tax increases, frequently imposing constitutional
restrictions on taxing and borrowing.72  When states encountered the
recession of the early 1980s, these new revenue constraints led to profound
turmoil in government budgeting.73 Private prisons benefited from this
movement in two ways. First, despite the overall pressure to reduce
67. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §§ 801-810, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
68. See, e.g., DOROTHY SCHRADER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT: AN
OVERVIEW, at CRS-9 (1996) (describing the PLRA's main effect as "limit[ing] the authority of the
federal courts to fashion remedies to correct violations of federal rights.").
69. See McDONALD ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
70. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
71. RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 42 (2007) ("The federal retreat [from social spending] required subnational
polities and institutions to take responsibility for social problems whether they wanted to or not, forcing
them to deal with the newly dispossessed, who ranged from unemployed youth to financially needy
students to homeless families. The contemporary rise of the local state, celebrated by so many
geographers, represents in part a generally reactionary move to reexternalize, or keep external, such
social burdens and fiscal costs."). While Gilmore's work is specific to California, it is generally an
excellent portrayal of a narrative that was repeated in many states. See id. at 40-42. Not only is the
California story indicative of other states' experiences because all states, to some degree, face similar
challenges as actors in the federalist system, but California's policy innovations (especially in the realm
of taxpayer activism) were often exported to other states. For example, understanding Colorado's recent
fiscal policy necessitates an understanding of ballot-measure activist Douglas Bruce (author of the
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights), who formed his political ideology in southern California during the 1970s
and 1980s. See OffLimits, DENY. WESTWORD, Aug. 31, 1994, at 9.
72. GILMORE, supra note 71, at 42-43.
73. Id. at 42-50.
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spending, prisons often enjoyed favored status due to public fear of crime
and the ability of the state to justify public safety as an essential
governmental function.7 4 Second, even though incarceration as a concept
received favored political status, fiscal constraints made borrowing for new
construction difficult-thus privatization emerged as a popular alternative.75
This popularity depended on the notion that contract facilities would avoid
the need for state borrowing or expansion of public payrolls. 76 At the same
time, by expanding prison capacity through private facilities, policy-makers
could claim cost savings through private sector "innovations. '77
After its initial growth stage, the private prison industry encountered a
period of financial distress in the late 1990s. 78 Highly publicized operating
failures battered the image of the industry. The failures included a barrage
of escapes, assaults, and murders at CCA's Northeast Ohio Correctional
Center79 and a series of assaults, murders, and guard brutality at two
Wackenhut prisons in New Mexico. 0 Industry observers expected that two
pieces of Congressional legislation in 1996 and 1997 would provide an
infusion of new contracts for the industry. 1 In anticipation of those new
74. Id. at 83-86 ("The central contradiction for the waning welfare-warfare, or military Keynesian, state
was this: the outcomes of tax struggle translated into delegitimation of programs the state could use to
put surpluses back to work, while at the same time, the state retained bureaucratic and fiscal apparatuses
from the golden age. The massive restructuring of the state's tax base in effect made surplus the
Keynesian state's capacities. However, the state did not disappear .... Rather, what withered was the
state's legitimacy to act as the Keynesian state .... [T]he new state built itself in part by building
prisons .... The result was an emerging apparatus that, in an echo of the Cold War Pentagon's stance
on communism, presented its social necessity in terms of an impossible goal-containment of crime,
understood as an elastic category spanning a dynamic alleged continuum of dependency and
depravation. The crisis of state capacity then became, peculiarly, its own solution, as the welfare-
warfare state began the transformation, bit by bit, to the permanent crisis workfare-warfare state, whose
domestic militarism is concretely recapitulated in the landscapes of depopulated urban communities and
rural prison towns.").
75. Id. at 122.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 122-25.
78. See, e.g., PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, JAIL BREAKS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO PRIVATE PRISONS 13-17 (2001).
79. JOHN L. CLARK, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: INSPECTION AND REVIEW OF THE
NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER (Nov. 25, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/aglyoungstown/youngstown.htm.
80. DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT Assocs., INC., GOVERNMENTS' MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE
PRISONS xxii-xxiii (2003).
81. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 increased the use of
immigrant detention, a field which has historically relied upon contractor-operated facilities. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 div. C, § 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006)
(creating restrictions for release of apprehended aliens); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 div. C, § 305(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (prohibiting the release of aliens
pending execution of a deportation order). The National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government
Improvement Act of 1997 dissolved the District of Columbia prison system and placed sentenced
District of Columbia felons in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Pub. L. No. 105-
33, § 11201(b), 111 Stat. 251, 735. The Act directed BOP to house at least half of all District of
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contracts, prison companies embarked on aggressive financing plans which
ultimately left the industry in even greater turmoil. CCA and Wackenhut
both experimented with real estate investment trusts ("REIT"s) and
ultimately saw their stock prices decline precipitously due to investor
disapproval.8 2 CCA's REIT-financing experience was so disastrous that in
2000 its independent auditor expressed "substantial doubt" about the ability
of CCA (then operating under the name Prison Realty Trust) to continue. 83
Although CCA and Wackenhut both recovered from their late 1990s
financial slumps, they remain highly leveraged and depend on further
expansion to decrease corporate debt.
By 2000, growth in private prisons seemed to be slowing.8 4 No state was
soliciting new private prison contracts, and some existing contracts had
been curtailed or rescinded.85 Yet, between 2000 and 2005 (the most recent
year for which data is currently available), 151 new privately operated
prisons came on-line, and the private sector share of all U.S. correctional
facilities jumped from sixteen to twenty-three percent.86 What caused this
resurgence? Although there are several contributing factors, the primary
catalyst has been the birth of the "national market" for private prison beds.87
Columbia inmates in private facilities by 2003. Id. § 11201(c)(1). Although the Deputy Attorney
General is required to submit annual progress reports to Congress, detailing the BOP's compliance with
this privatization requirement, the Department of Justice has yet to provide these reports to the author as
requested. See Letter from James Killens III, FOIA Specialist, Office of Info. & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Stephen Raher (Mar. 10, 2009) (on file with author) (indicating that the records requested
"require a search in another office" and that staff has not been "able to complete a search to determine
whether there are records within the scope of your request"); Letter from Carmen L. Mallon, Chief of
Staff, Office of Info. & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Stephen Raher (Apr. 8, 2009) (on file with
author) (denying author's request for expedited processing).
82. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 49, at 28-29.
83. Prison Realty Trust, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-16 (Mar. 30, 2000).
84. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 49, at 6 ("[I]ndications show that growth in privatization may be
slowing. For example . . . private facility bed capacity has not increased since January 1, 1998.
Additionally, stock prices for most of the major firms have dropped substantially in the past year. There
have also been a number of highly publicized management problems with several privately operated
facilities.").
85. Judith Greene, Bailing Out the Private Prison Industry, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, May 2002, at 1.
86. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005, at 1 (2008). In 2005, there were a total of 415 privately operated
prisons in the United States, housing an average daily population of 105,451 inmates. Id. at app. tbl.9.
Although the Bureau of Justice Statistics issues annual revisions to these figures, the data does not
provide information on company-specific market shares, nor the total capacity of the private prison
system. Periodic data on the industry's total capacity used to be reported by the Private Corrections
Project at the University of Florida-a research organization that abruptly shut down when its founder
and director, Professor Charles Thomas, resigned after being fined by the Florida Ethics Commission for
accepting compensation from CCA's real estate investment trust. See generally Gilbert Geis, Alan
Mobley & David Shichor, Private Prisons, Criminological Research, and Conflict of Interest: A Case
Study, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 372 (1999).
87. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 80, at v.
IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY
220 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND TE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:xiii
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Dueling Markets
The most important recent development in private prisons is the
emergence of two distinct markets for prison beds, which can be labeled the
"dominant mode" and the "national market. ' 88 The dominant mode, the
model originally presented to policy-makers as the "private prison fix,"
entails a state agency contracting for some of its needed prison beds and
forming a one-to-one relationship with a contractor. 89 The national market
for private prisons is an outgrowth of the speculative prison-building boom
of the 1980s.90 In the national market, prison operators advertise available
capacity to jurisdictions across the country, often filling a facility with
inmates from multiple agencies. 91 Despite the growing prevalence of
facilities in the national market,92 little research has been done on the effects
of this system.
Not surprisingly, there is qualitative evidence to suggest that inmate
management is more difficult when prisoners are shipped to foreign
jurisdictions.93 Not only are prisoners less happy when serving time far
away from family and friends, but housing inmates from different
jurisdictions (who are subject to different administrative regulations) in one
facility often breeds tension.94 There are systemic problems as well. A
1998 survey of private prisons found that states paid higher per diem rates
for out-of-state facilities than for in-state contracts, suggesting upward price
88. Id.
89. Id. ("[Tihe state prison system is the contractor's sole client at the facility; the only prisoners held in
the facility are those under the jurisdiction of the client state agency. Moreover, the prison is in the
same state as the publicly operated prisons, which creates at least some of the conditions supportive of a
close integration between the publicly operated facilities and the privately operated prisons.").
90. See, e.g., Patrice Hill, Private Prisons Are Riskiest COP Deals Going, "Fundamentally Flawed,"
Nuveen Report Says, BOND BUYER, Nov. 2, 1993, at 1 (describing 1990s speculative prison financing).
91. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 80, at v ("Many of these facilities that are oriented to the national
market may not have any prisoners at all from the correctional agencies in the states in which they are
located. Indeed, they may have no relationship with the state governments in these states, other than an
obligation to pay corporate income taxes. Owners of private property do not need licenses from state
correctional agencies to build and operate imprisonment facilities and, until recently, most state
legislatures have not established regulatory systems to govern private prison operations.").
92. Id. at 7 (identifying eighty-four privately operated prisons in 1998 which had contracts to house
state inmates from a foreign jurisdiction).
93. E.g., Matthew T. Clarke, Uprisings at CCA Prisons Reveal Weaknesses in Out-of-State
Imprisonment Policies, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 2005, at 26.
94. Id; NOLIN RENFROW ET AL., COLO. DEP'T OF CORR., AFTER ACTION REPORT: INMATE RIOT:
CROWLEY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, JULY 20, 2004, at 14 (Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with author)
[hereafter "CCCF AFTER ACTION REPORT"] (citing "[i]nmates' allegations of treatment disparity
between Colorado inmates and Washington inmates regarding allowable property and food portions" as
a contributing factor in the 2004 riot at the CCA-operated Crowley County facility).
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pressure confronting states that must resort to the national bed market.95
The same survey revealed monitoring problems attendant to use of the
national market. Survey data show that fifty-two percent of in-state
contract facilities are monitored by government staff devoting over eighty
hours per month to the facility-with nearly half (forty-eight percent) of
these facilities covered by full-time monitors.96 In contrast, ninety percent
of national-market facilities received less than twenty hours of monitoring a
month.97 Moreover, in-state contract monitors were four times as likely to
receive job-specific training than those assigned to out-of-state facilities.9
Predictably, qualitative data from the survey showed that correctional
staffers generally perceived service from out-of-state facilities to be of
lower quality.99 Despite the problems inherent in the national market, states
with inadequate prison capacity (and a lack of political will to reduce prison
populations) are left with no immediate alternative other than seeking beds
from this non-traditional market. While utilization of out-of-state beds is
more expensive in the long term, it avoids immediate outlays for new prison
construction, thus allowing short-term budget balancing. 100
While the 1998 survey focused on state governments' utilization of out-
of-state prisons, 10 1 the national market has been significantly enhanced
through the workings of a federal agency, the Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee ("OFDT"). Created in 2000,102 the OFDT was formed in
response to Congressional "concerns about the problem of inadequate
planning and management of detention space in the Department of
Justice. '10 3  The House committee report accompanying the enabling
legislation anticipated the Office would be given responsibility for
"oversight of detention management, as well as improvement and
95. MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 80, at 7, 9 (finding that all national-market contracts examined in the
survey charged per diem rates over thirty-five dollars, which exceeded the price charged by fifty-five
percent of in-state contracts).
96. Id. at 30.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 31 ("Not surprisingly, the most publicly visible troubles in privately operated prisons have
occurred most often in these arrangements whereby governments contract with out-of-state facilities to
hold prisoners. State contract administrators and monitors also rated their performance below that
observed at in-state facilities with which states had (mostly) exclusive relationships. In 38 percent of all
contracts or agreements with out-of-state facilities, the monitors or administrators rated the quality of the
service as below that of comparable facilities in their own department of correction, compared with 7
percent of the contracts with in-state facilities.").
100. Id. at 87.
101. See id. at 8 tbl. 1.2 (listing ten states that housed inmates in out-of-state facilities as of December
31, 1997).
102. Pub. L. No. 106-553, app. B, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-52 (2000).
103. H.R. REP. No. 106-680, at 13 (2000).
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coordination of detention issues" throughout the Department of Justice. 10 4
As enacted, the bill contained slightly broader language, authorizing the
trustee to "exercise all power and functions authorized by law relating to the
detention of Federal prisoners in non-Federal institutions." 105 At the time
the bill was enacted, all federal non-military prisoners were held by one of
three Department of Justice agencies-the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), U.S.
Marshals Service ("USMS"), or the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS").10 6 Because the final language was not limited to the Department
of Justice, OFDT has retained power over certain aspects of immigrant
detention, even when INS moved to the new Department of Homeland
Security.10 7 OFDT has changed the dynamics of the modem private prison
industry, with many of these changes distorting what little competition
existed. 108 OFDT utilizes contractual terms that are unusually favorable to
contractors, and its role as a centralized federal procurer of beds on the
national market has disadvantaged state governments that depend on private
prison capacity.109
During its short existence, the OFDT has carried out two types of prison
procurement activities: contracting for entire facilities and more piecemeal
"bed brokering."110  The facility-level contracting-which follows the
traditional, dominant mode of state contracting-has provided a new source
of revenue for the private prison industry. Ironically, while OFDT has
played a crucial role in the constructive federal bailout of the industry, its
procurement processes contradict many of the economic arguments in favor
of privatization. Industry supporters frequently point to competition as a
benefit of correctional outsourcing.1 ' OFDT's procurement practices,
104. Id.
105. Pub. L. No. 106-553, app. B, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-52 (emphasis added).
106. Office of the Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, About OFDT, http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/about-
ofdt.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
107. It is not clear, however, whether OFDT exercises any substantial power over Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detention operations. Although OFDT claims to "manage[] all OFDT
awarded private facilities providing services to the ICE," it does not specify how many facilities fall into
this category. OFFICE OF THE FED. DET. TR., DETENTION STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE DIVISION
(information brochure), available at http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/qap-brochure.pdf. Moreover, OFDT's
description of its "Quality Assurance Review" program specifies that the only Intergovernmental
Service Agreement facilities subject to OFDT quality reviews are those that house an average daily
population of 500 or more USMS detainees. Id.
108. See OFFICE OF THE FED. DET. TR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINANCING DETENTION FACILITIES 1-2
(2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ofdt-handbook-20090422.pdf [hereinafter FINANCING
DETENTION FACILITIES].
109. See id. at 2.
110. See id. at 61-62.
111. E.g., Ass'n of Private Corr. & Treatment Orgs., Increased Accountability, http://www.apcto.org/
increaseaccountability.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) ("Private operators must ... [clompete to earn
the privilege of operating a correctional facility, and then re-bid on a regular basis."); see also Bruce L.
Benson, Do We Want the Production of Prison Services to be More "Efficient"?, in CHANGING THE
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however, vitiate any pretense of competitive bidding. 112 OFDT frequently
issues sole-source contracts for entire facilities. 113 In other cases, OFDT
has issued a "sources sought" notice seeking bids, but defined the eligibility
requirements so narrowly as to limit the pool of eligible bidders to one
company, subsequently announcing a sole-source award. 114 Notably, most
of OFDT's solicitations are limited to bidders with an existing facility-a
requirement that not only limits the potential pool of bidders, but also
increases the incentive for companies to eschew or terminate state contracts
in favor of more lucrative federal contracts.115
OFDT's other major procurement activity is the Detention Services
Network ("DSNetwork"), a national online bed-brokering platform which
has fused the national private corrections market with advanced information
technology. 116 OFDT advertises DSNetwork as "a multifaceted, full-
service Internet site to meet all detention service needs." 117 Other than a
GUARD: PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 163, 175 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003)
("Private producers cannot simply cut costs by cutting quality and continue to count on an undiminished
flow of revenues because consumers will turn to substitutes that are of higher quality for the price or to
lower-price substitutes of comparable quality. Thus, competition forces private firms to offer relatively
high-quality services at relatively low prices. Technological efficiency results from competitive
pressures and from the profit motive."). Although Benson provided a general discussion of competition,
he proceeded to note some ways in which the private prison industry has not, and should not, follow
classical economic theory. Benson, supra note 111, at 176-77.
112. See FINANCING DETENTION FACILITIES, supra note 108, at 61.
113. E.g., Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Award for Detention Services in Clayton
County, Georgia, Solicitation No. 101507 (Oct. 16, 2007) (awarding sole source contract to GEO Group
on behalf of the USMS for a detention facility in Clayton County, Georgia); Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Queens/Brooklyn Detention Services, Solicitation No. ODT-7-R-0002 (Jun. 4, 2007)
(issuing a non-competitive contract on behalf of the USMS); Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Contract Detention Facility, Solicitation No. ODT-USMS-7-0001 (May 18, 2007) (awarding
sole source contract to CCA on behalf of the USMS for Pinal County, Arizona detention facility).
114. Compare Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comprehensive Secure Detention Services:
Sources Sought Notice, Solicitation No. ODT-6-R-0002 (Jan. 6, 2006) (seeking an "existing secured
detention facility located within the geographic boundaries of Leavenworth, Kansas with a capacity of
not less than 802 beds"), with Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Detention Center:
Presolicitation Notice, Solicitation No. ODT-6-R-0002 (Feb. 8, 2006) (declaring one responsible source
and awarding sole-source contract to CCA); compare Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Contract Detention Facility: Sources Sought Notice, Solicitation No. ODT-USMS-5-0001 (Mar. 30,
2005) (seeking an "existing secured detention facility located within the geographic boundaries of San
Diego County, California with a capacity of not less than 700 beds"), with Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Contract Detention Facility: Presolicitation Notice, Solitication No. ODT-5-R-0004
(May 10, 2005) (declaring one responsible source and awarding sole-source contract to GEO Group).
115. E.g., Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comprehensive Secure Detention Services:
Sources Sought Notice, Solicitation No. ODT-6-R-0002 (Jan. 6, 2006) (seeking an "existing secured
detention facility located within the geographic boundaries of Leavenworth, Kansas"); Office of Fed.
Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Detention Facility: Sources Sought Notice, Solicitation No.
ODT-USMS-5-0001 (Mar. 30, 2005) (seeking an "existing secured detention facility located within the
geographic boundaries of San Diego County, California").
116. Office of the Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, DSNetwork,
http://www.justice.gov/ofdtldsnetwork.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
117. OFFICE OF THE FED. DET. TR., DSNETWORK INITIATIVE (information brochure), available at
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cursory explanation of the features and technology behind DSNetwork,
OFDT provides no information on the system, such as the identity of
entities providing beds through the system, the number of inmates placed
through the system, or the amount of money disbursed for DSNetwork
placements.118 In fact, other than one webpage with USMS statistics, 119
OFDT has released little information about its operations. While OFDT
also performs work for the BOP and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), almost all publicly available data concerning the
agency's operations are limited to USMS.1 20 The three federal civil
detention agencies (BOP, ICE, and USMS) are the only agencies who use
DSNetwork to purchase prison beds.1 21 Because these federal agencies are
generally better funded than state corrections departments, DSNetwork's
facilitation of federal bed procurement runs the risk of applying upward
price pressure on state governments in need of immediate bed space.
Moreover, because DSNetwork appears to be available to any local
government or private agency that wishes to make beds available,122 it has
the potential to radically increase the scope and size of the national bed
market.
B. The New Growth Market: Immigrant Detention
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now known as
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")) has always relied heavily
on privatized facilities. Not only did INS issue the first modern contract for
a privately operated adult correctional facility, but it continues to utilize a
growing network of privately operated detention centers. 123 Precise data on
ICE privatization is difficult to find. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
reported that in 2007, ICE housed 20,711 immigrant detainees in
Intergovernmental Service Agreement ("IGSA") and BOP facilities. 124
While ICE does not regularly publish a list of the IGSA facilities, it did
include such a list in a 2008 solicitation for a telecommunications services
http://www.usdoj.gov/ ofdt/dsn brochure.pdf.
118. See id.
119. Office of Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep't of Justice, OFDT Statistics,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ofdt/statistics.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
120. See id.
121. OFFICE OF THE FED. DET. TR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC BUSINESS PROCESS FOR
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS 6 fig. 1 (Oct. 2009).
122. Id.
123. Corr. Corp. of Am., Our History, http://www.correctionscorp.com/about/cca-history/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
124. Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec.
2008, at26 app. tbl.18.
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contract. 125 The IGSA facilities are mostly county jails, although a few
state prisons appear on the list as well.126 The solicitation separates IGSA
facilities into two categories: those which hold detainees for seventy-two
hours or less and those which hold for over seventy-two hours.127 In total,
the solicitation lists 206 "Over 72 hours" facilities and 139 "Under 72
hours" facilities, but does not provide information on the total size of each
contract. 128 While the majority of ICE detainees are held in IGSA facilities,
about one-third are held in ICE facilities. 129 These ICE facilities consist of
both contractor-owned-and-operated detention centers, as well as ICE-
owned facilities. 130 The ICE website lists eighteen such facilities, of which
five are contractor-owned-and-operated. 131 The remaining detention centers
listed are owned by ICE, but operated by contractors. 132
125. Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement of Objectives,
Solicitation No. HSCETE-08-R-00001, at 28-36 (Jan. 3, 2008) (on file with author). The solicitation
documents have subsequently been removed from the Federal Business Opportunities website.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. West & Sabol, supra note 124.
130. Id.
131. U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement, Immigration Detention Facilities,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/facilities.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). The webpage actually lists 22
facilities, however, one (San Pedro Service Processing Center) is closed, and three (Pinal County Adult
Detention Center, Stewart Detention Center, and Willacy County Detention Center) appear to be IGSA
facilities. See id.
132. See Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Detention Services,
Solicitation No. HSCEDM-09-R-00001 (May 29, 2009) (Florence Service Processing Center);
Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Detention Services, Solicitation
No. HSCEDM-09-R-00008 (May 22, 2009) (El Centro Service Processing Center); Immigrations and
Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 6-Month Extension of Contract ACD-3-C-0007 for
Detention Services at El Paso Service Processing Center, Solicitation No. HSCEDM-08-R-00012 (Aug.
21, 2008) (El Paso Service Processing Center); Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Detention Services at the Krome Service Processing Center, Solicitation No. HSCEDM-
08-R-00009 (Aug. 4, 2008) (Krome Service Processing Center); Immigrations and Custom
Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Detention Services at the Port Isabel Service Processing
Center, Solicitation No. HSCEDM-08-R-00007 (Jan. 15, 2008) (Port Isabel Service Processing Center);
Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Transportation & Detention
Services, Solicitation No. PRO-8-L011 (Nov. 9, 2007) (Broward Transitional Center); Immigrations and
Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 6-Month Extension of ACB-3-C-0002 for
Detention Services at Batavia Service Processing Center, Solicitation No. HSCEDM-08-R-00014 (Aug.
21, 2008) (Batavia Service Processing Center); Immigrations and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., Aguadilla Detention Support, Solicitation No. HSCEOP-06-R-00012 (Jan. 19, 2007)
(Aguadilla Service Processing Center). The remaining four facilities do not have procurement
information listed in Federal Business Opportunities. However, two (LaSalle Detention Facility and
South Texas Detention Facility) are listed as management contract facilities in Wackenhut/GEO's
annual report. GEO Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10, 12 (Feb. 15, 2008). ICE's website
states that the remaining two facilities are operated under contract by CCA (Otay Detention Facility) and
Ahtna Technical Services, Inc. (Varick Federal Detention Facility). U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, San Diego Field Office: Otay Detention Facility,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/facilities/otay.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010); U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, New York City Filed Office: Varick Federal Detention Facility,
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In August 2009, ICE announced an initiative to reform its immigrant
detention operations.133 Although the proposal is framed in terms of
improving conditions of confinement, few details have been provided. 134
Initial information from ICE indicates that the federal government will rely
less on IGSA facilities. 135 Nonetheless, total detention population may not
change, 136 and ICE does not appear to be questioning the use of private
prisons.137 Indeed, to the extent that detainees are shifted from IGSA
detention to contractor-operated facilities, overall revenue to private prison
operators may increase.
Although immigrant detention policy necessarily begins with ICE, it
does not end there. Perhaps the single greatest salvation of the industry
(and certainly of CCA) has been the series of Criminal Alien Requirements
("CARs") issued by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Since 1999, the BOP
has issued several contracts for privately operated facilities to hold low-
security foreign nationals who are serving criminal sentences prior to
deportation. 138 There have been a total of twelve solicitations under the
CAR series, although the two most recent (CARs 11 and 12) are still
pending. 139 Two phases (CARs 3 and 9) were cancelled prior to award. 140
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/facilities/varick.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
133. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms (Aug. 6,
2009), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/2009 immigration detention reforms.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms].
134. See id.
135. Id. (describing ICE's intent to "move away from our present decentralized, jail-oriented approach
to a system wholly designed for and based on ICE's civil detention authorities.").
136. Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Overhaul Detention Policy for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at
Al ("Janet Napolitano, the secretary of homeland security, said last week that she expected the number
of detainees to stay the same or grow slightly.").
137. 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms, supra note 133 (describing ICE's plans to increase "direct
federal oversight" of privately operated facilities by providing one on-site monitor for each of the
twenty-three major contract detention facilities).
138. See, e.g, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Work, Solicitation No. RFP-
PCC-0010 ("CAR-6 RFP"), at 11 (May 26, 2006) (setting "forth the contract requirements for
management of a contract correctional institution(s) to accommodate approximately 7,000 beds for a
low security adult male population consisting primarily of criminal aliens. The criminal alien
population will ordinarily be low security non-U.S. citizen, primarily Mexican, adult males with sixty
months or less remaining to serve on their sentences.").
139. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
140. See Notice of Cancellation of Environmental Impact Statement Process: Criminal Alien
Requirement Phase III-Arizona and California, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,826 (May 10, 2002) (although the
notice references a cancellation notice in Commerce Business Daily, this notice, along with many other
documents pertaining to the early CARs is no longer available); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't. of
Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0013, Amendment 12 (Mar. 1, 2010) (cancellation of CAR-9 RFP).
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Obtaining salient information about the CAR contracts is extremely
difficult. 141  Based on available solicitation documents, the six CAR
contracts for non-federal facilities 142 may potentially provide capacity of up
to 22,000 beds. 143 Award notices for CAR phases 4 through 10 estimate
that the aggregate price for the five contracts, over their respective four-year
base periods, will be near $2.19 billion.144 BOP's pricing terms are far
more favorable to contractors than most state contracts. Most notably, after
an introductory period, once facility population exceeds fifty percent of
contract capacity, the contractor is paid a fixed monthly operating price for
the remainder of the contract term, regardless of actual inmate
141. The author requested documents pertaining to four CAR contracts under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"). The BOP denied the author's request for a FOIA fee waiver and demanded
payment of $1,642.95 before it would produce the responsive documents. Letter from Wanda M. Hunt,
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to Stephen Raher (Dec. 2, 2008) (on file with author). The author promptly
appealed the fee waiver denial, but the Department of Justice failed to comply with the statutory
timeline for administrative adjudication and did not responded to repeated inquiries concerning the
status of the appeal. See infra note 147147.
142. CAR-7 is excluded from this analysis, as it is a "management only" contract for the federally-
owned correctional institution in Taft, California. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Solicitation No. PCC-RFP-001 1 ("CAR-7 RFP") (Aug. 8, 2006).
143. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0012 ("CAR-8
RFP") (Apr. 29, 2008) (seeking approximately 4,000 beds); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-00010 ("CAR-6 RFP") (May 26, 2006) (seeking approximately
7,000 beds); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0009 ("CAR-5
RFP") (Jun. 21, 2005) (seeking approximately 1,200 beds); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0008 ("CAR-4 RFP") (Feb. 13, 2004) (seeking approximately 1,000
beds); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0006 ("CAR-2 RFP")
(Apr. 5, 2000) (seeking approximately 1,500 beds); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Solicitation No. RFP-PCC-0005 ("CAR-1 RFP") (Aug. 10, 1999) (seeking up to 7,500 beds). This
analysis does not include the two most recent contracts, awarded under CAR-10. These two contracts
appear to be replacements for the CAR-1 contracts, which were set to expire in 2010. See Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PC011 (Jan. 12, 2010) (awarding contract
to CCA); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO12 (Jan. 12,
2010) (awarding contract to Cornell Companies).
144. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO1 1 (Jan. 12,
2010) ($306 million contract to CCA for CAR-10); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Contract Award No. DJB1PC012 (Jan. 12, 2010) ($553 million contract to Cornell Companies for CAR-
10); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO10 (Apr. 1, 2009)
($226 million contract to CCA for CAR-8); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract
Award No. DJB1BPC0O9 (Apr. 25, 2007) ($143 million contract to Management and Training Corp. for
CAR-7); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO05 (Jan. 17, 2007)
($119 million contract to CCA for CAR-6); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract
Award No. DJB1PC0O4 (Jan. 17, 2007) ($269 million contract to Cornell Companies for CAR-6); Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO08 (Jan. 17, 2007) ($63 million
contract to LCS Corrections Servs. for CAR-6); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract
Award No. DJB1PCO06 (Jan. 17, 2007) ($122 million contract to Management and Training Corp. for
CAR-6); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO07 (Jan. 17, 2007)
($187 million contract to Reeves County, Texas for CAR-6); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO03 (May 24, 2006) ($76 million contract to Reeves County,
Texas for CAR-5); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO02
(Feb. 13, 2004) ($129 million contract to CCA for CAR-4).
IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY
228 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIII:xiii
population.145  Such payment structures could arguably benefit the
contracting agency if consistently high population levels were expected, but
the CAR contracts do not even offer this protection to the government,
since contractors receive an additional "fixed incremental unit price" when
inmate population exceeds ninety percent of the contracted capacity.1 46
Analyzing the actual budgetary impact of the CAR pricing structure is not
possible, since the BOP has refused to release the payment formulae
contained in the executed CAR contracts. 147
Given the favorable terms and pricing structures utilized by the BOP, 148
the CAR contracts are particularly valuable to prison operators. Not only
have the CAR awards infused cash into an industry that might otherwise be
on the brink of insolvency, but the BOP's preference for contracting with
pre-existing facilities places the agency in a superior competitive position
vis-d-vis state corrections departments that are in need of additional prison
capacity.1 49
IV. EFFECT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL STATUS
Supporters of privatization frequently cite the industry's non-
governmental status as a benefit, insofar as it allows for "innovation."150
145. See, e.g, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contract Award No. DJB1PCO03 (May 24,
2006).
146. Id.
147. When the author originally requested CAR procurement data from BOP under FOIA, BOP refused
to produce the requested documents. See supra note 141141. When the author filed suit in U.S. District
Court, the BOP provided several operating contracts, but redacted the relevant pricing formulae, saying
such information falls within FOIA's exemption for trade secrets. See Vaughn Index, Raher v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, No. CV-09-526-ST (D. Or., July 23, 2009) (on file with author) (claiming that
"[rielease of such pricing information would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
submitter [i.e., contractor] on future bidding and would reveal elements crucial in determining the
submitters [sic] pricing structure.").
148. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
150. Notably, leading privatization supporter Charles Thomas recently admitted that promises of
innovation were oversold. See Charles W. Thomas, Correctional Privatization in America: An
Assessment of Its Historical Origins, Present Status, and Future Prospects, in CHANGING THE GUARD:
PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 57, 81-82 (Alexander Tabarrok ed., 2003) ("I expected
that the private sector would bring much by way of creativity and innovation to corrections that would
then cause the diffusion of innovative approaches to public correctional agencies. I was more wrong
than right in this regard. I have seen a great deal of creativity and innovation on the front of facility
design and construction as well as in the greater willingness of the private sector to accept technological
innovation in, for example, the area of security. Thus far, however, I am unimpressed by the creativity
that the private sector has brought to the table in such areas as staffing patterns, performance incentive
programs for employees, fringe benefit and retirement programs for employees, and innovative
programs for prisoners that include adequately sophisticated measures of in-program and postrelease
outcomes.").
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Although this assertion is questionable to begin with,151 it also fails to take
into account the detriments associated with carceral operations by non-
governmental entities. The disadvantages of non-governmental prison
operations are numerous and varied. This section begins with a general
discussion of the problems of prison operators' non-governmental status. It
then focuses on the two most prominent issues: liability and public access
to information.
At the broadest level of analysis, government outsourcing serves to
diffuse state sovereignty. White has framed the problem of prison
privatization as representing
neither the straightforward retreat of sovereignty, nor its
outright expansion. Rather the private prison is
fundamentally premised on a dynamic that combines these
tendencies, that seems to represent both the apparent retreat
and the advance of the state in the prison context. It is in
this sense that private prisons must be understood in terms
of the extension and diffusion of sovereignty. 15 2
In other words, states can expand the prison system (arguably the most
extreme use of state's coercive powers) while simultaneously relinquishing
government control over many features of the carceral apparatus. 153 As
White elaborates, "the juridical structure of the private prison attenuates and
ultimately insulates the state from accountability of a more symbolic,
political kind. Private prisons tend to distance public officials from
responsibility for the way private prisons are run. '154 Although White
describes corruption as the most obvious example, he also notes that "the
private prison converts the problems of prisons-which are endemic and
substantial in every case-into management questions and questions of
relative performance, efficiency, contract interpretation, and so forth. '155
Private prison supporters cite a number of positive performance
151. See, e.g., AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 49, at 37-38 ("[A] coherent theory of why privately
operated prisons would outperform public facilities has yet to emerge. Instead, one could argue that the
private sector has simply drawn upon the methods used by the public sector with respect to inmate
management and staffing and only attempted to reduce the costs associated with that model. In effect,
the private sector may be applying a more efficient model that is essentially mimicking the public sector
.... Should this approach be considered by policymakers, the future of privatization may be very
limited as the public sector in turn copies the private sector's methods." (citing Gerald G. Gaes, Scott D.
Camp & William G. Saylor, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A
Review of Research, in DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCS. INC., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE app. 2, at 31-33 (1998))).
152. White, supra note 11, at 137 (emphasis in original).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 139.
155. Id.
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evaluations as proof of success. 156 To the extent that supporters admit
shortcomings in the industry, they often rationalize failures by claiming that
prisons are messy enterprises that will never be perfect.157 Of course, this
argument is not limited to private operators. State corrections officials also
seek to explain their failures with similar logic.158 The diffusion of
sovereignty can be illustrated by the different ways in which private and
public actors employ these arguments. Using a hypothetical, suppose a
concerned party (e.g., a family member of a prisoner, an inmate's attorney,
or a policy advocate) identifies a failure within a prison system. The
process of ameliorating this failure begins quite similarly whether the
prison is publicly or privately operated. Assuming, as is often the case, the
concerned party cannot resolve the issue with the corrections department,
156. E.g., Corr. Corp. of Am., Public-Private Partnership in Corrections: A Series of Evaluation
Studies, http://www.correctionscorp.com/cca-resource-center/research-findings/independent-studies-
prison-privatization/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter CCA Evaluation Studies]. CCA's webpage
of "independent" research prominently features an abstract of a 2007 study by Vanderbilt University
professors James F. Blumstein and Mark A. Cohen. See id. It does not mention that the research project
was funded by CCA and the Association for Private Correctional and Treatment Organizations, a private
prison trade organization. See id; James F. Blumstein et al., Do Government Agencies Respond to
Market Pressures? Evidence from Private Prisons, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 446, 446 n.* (2008). The
CCA webpage then lists seventeen additional studies purporting to present favorable evidence of
correctional privatization. See CCA Evaluation Studies, supra note 156. Two of the studies are from
1993, before meaningful performance data was available. See id. Eight are published by conservative
think-tanks who have broad pro-privatization agendas (including three publications from the Reason
Public Policy Institute, two chapters from a book published by the Independent Institute, and one
publication each from the Rio Grande Foundation and the Alabama Policy Institute). See id. Three of
the listed publications are not "studies," but rather presentations made by industry advocates to various
boards or legislative committees. See id. One article is an unsigned student law review note which,
although published in a prominent journal, is a discussion of legal theory rather than performance
evaluation. See id; Developments in the Law The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2002).
The remaining three items consist of a 1999 report by the Florida Office of Program Analysis and
Government Accountability (which has been followed by several more critical reports), a three page
1997 study of three prisons in Louisiana, and a 1996 article by privatization supporter Charles Logan.
See CCA Evaluation Studies, supra note 156; William G. Archambeault & Donald R. Deis, Jr., Cost
Effectiveness Comparisons of Private Versus Public Prisons in Louisiana: A Comprehensive Analysis of
Allen, Avoyelles, and Winn Correctional Centers, 4 J. OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES. CONSORTIUM 566
(1997); Fla. Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov't Accountability, While DMS Has Improved
Monitoring, It Needs to Strengthen Private Prison Oversight and Contracts (Rep. No. 08-71) (Dec.
2008); Charles H. Logan, Public vs. Private Prison Management: A Case Comparison, 21 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 62 (1996).
157. See, e.g., Corr. Corp. of Am., Facts vs. Myths, http://www.thecca360.com/facts.php (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010) ("The nature of the industry means that the potential for incidents and disruptions always
exists."). Although this CCA-created webpage declares "as a result of CCA's dedication to safety and
continual improvement of services, average rates for violent incidents and escapes at CCA facilities are
lower than rates at similar public facilities," CCA provides no substantiating evidence, thus raising
questions of data analysis and methodology. See id. CCA's unsubstantiated claim is even more suspect
in light of Austin and Coventry's data analysis, which found that although for some operations metrics
there is not a statistically significant difference between public and private facilities, there is "one major
exception: in this comparison [of controlling facility security level], the privately operated facilities have
a much higher rate of inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults and other disturbances." AuSTiN &
COVENTRY, supra note 49, at 52, 57 tbl.20.
158. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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she can raise the issue with the legislature.159 Often, general apathy toward
prison conditions will preclude any meaningful response. But in cases
where legislators are motivated to seriously inquire about the operating
failure, prison administrators (public or private) will often respond by
arguing, in essence, that they have a difficult job which cannot be
understood by those outside the corrections profession. 160 After the opening
inquiry and response, the argument becomes a garden-variety policy
debate-both sides will articulate their own narrative, and the outcome will
be determined through the legislative process. If the prison administrator
can persuade the legislature that his job is complex and specialized, the
status quo will prevail.
The difference between the public and private prison systems comes
when the concerned party prevails in her argument. The legislature is able
to demand immediate change from a state corrections agency. In contrast,
the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from impairing an existing
contract with a private operator. Even if the needed change can be
accomplished without unconstitutionally impairing the operator's
contractual rights, an unwelcome change may provoke the private operator
to terminate the contract at the soonest opportunity. 161 Moreover, the
legislature must rely on the corrections agency to effectively resolve
problems with private operators. This reliance on administrators not only
inserts another layer of bureaucracy in an already opaque accountability
system, but may ultimately fail to solve problems if the agency is timid in
enforcing contractual terms because of a dependency on private-sector
capacity.
159. A party could, in theory, address his concerns directly to a private prison operator, but if the issue
is at all serious, the contractor is quite unlikely to negotiate with a private citizen. Contracts and
corporate literature are quite clear that private prison operators view their only "customers" as
contracting agencies rather than inmates, family members, or policy advocates.
160. This argument has deep historical roots. See Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United
States, 1865 1965, in THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN
WESTERN SOCIETY 151, 152 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998) (When late nineteenth
century prisons devolved into a state of "pervasive overcrowding, corruption, and cruelty ... [,]
Wardens did not so much deny this awful reality as explain it away, attributing most of the blame not to
those who administered the system but to those who experienced it."). This dynamic, which implicitly
or explicitly blames inmates for the systemic failings of the prison system, can also be seen in the
growth of the corrections industry as a "profession" complete with its own vocabulary and framework of
technical rationality-tools which help to dehumanize inmates and channel prison employee
dissatisfaction by directing it against inmates, politicians, and prisoner rights advocates who "don't
understand" the challenges facing the profession. See generally GuY B. ADAMS & DANNY L. BALFOUR,
UNMASKING ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL (1998).
161. For example, when Nevada Department of Corrections raised concerns about CCA's operations of
the Southern Nevada Women's Correctional Center, CCA elected not to renew its contract, citing
operating losses. See Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 7, 2005), at 32.
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A recent example of the "prisons are messy" argument and the
concomitant muddying of the waters of accountability played out in an
eight-year court battle in Texas. While serving a six-month sentence in a
Wackenhut-operated prison, Gregorio de la Rosa, Jr. was murdered in a
prison yard when two inmates smuggled a weapon out of their housing
unit.1 62 De la Rosa's estate argued that Wackenhut was negligent because it
failed to search the attackers when they left their housing unit, as required
by Texas prison regulations.1 63 The jury found Wackenhut negligent, but
the company appealed, saying the verdict could not stand because it was not
supported by expert testimony. 164 The court "disagreed that specialized
knowledge was required to show [it] had a duty to search the inmates
passing through the crash gate or that the failure to search the inmates
violated this duty. ' 165  The Texas Court of Appeals ruled against
Wackenhut, noting that the company had not cited a single relevant case to
support its argument. 166
The de la Rosa case shows that the "prisons are messy" argument does
not always prevail. Indeed, due to the particularly egregious facts of de la
Rosa's murder, it is not entirely surprising that the jury overcame any
potential bias based on de la Rosa's status as a prisoner.167 Given the
weakness of Wackenhut's legal arguments, it is also unsurprising that the
company lost on appeal.1 68 Nonetheless, the same arguments may well
have prevailed in a legislative venue, where the focus is on generally
applicable policy, not vindicating the rights of an individual crime victim.
Moreover, unlike an appellate court, legislators are overtly guided by value
judgments, such as legitimate policy beliefs (e.g., an inherent bias in favor
of outsourcing), and less principled factors, such as campaign contributions.
162. Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. de la Rosa, No. 13-06-00692-CV, 2009 WL 866791, at *1-2 (Tex. App.
Apr. 2, 2009).
163. Id. Wackenhut conceded that it was obligated to comply with a state regulation that stated, "The
officer shall conduct pat-searches of inmates before permitting entrance or exit to or from any
department within the area of responsibility." Id. at *1 (emphasis in original). But, Wackenhut argued
that its employee's failure to search the attackers did not violate the policy because the housing unit did
not constitute a "department." Brief of Appellant at 32, Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. de la Rosa, No. 13-
06-00692-CV, 2009 WL 866791 (Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2009) [hereafter Wackenhut Appellant Brief].
164. Wackenhut Appellant Brief, supra note 163, at 26 ("In this case, proof of negligence required
expert testimony. Expert testimony in a prison case is essential to support a claim because jurors are not
familiar with what is reasonable care in a prison environment.").
165. Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. de la Rosa, No. 13-06-00692-CV, 2009 WL 866791, at *21 (Tex. App.
Apr. 2, 2009).
166. Id. at *21 n.33.
167. Id. at *1 ("A few days before his expected release, Gregorio was beaten to death by two other
inmates using a lock tied to a sock, while Wackenhut's officers stood by and watched and Wackenhut's
wardens smirked and laughed.").
168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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An example of legislative acquiescence to industry arguments can be
found in the 2008 Congressional hearings concerning the Private Prison
Information Act.169  Tom Jawetz, an ACLU staff attorney, testified
concerning the need for increased public access to information on private
prison operations. 170  While raising doubts about Jawetz's credibility,
Representative Louie Gohmert (R-TX) asked him if he had ever requested a
tour of a private prison. 171 When Jawetz replied that a two-hour tour does
not give the visitor a comprehensive picture of facility operations, Gohmert
flippantly replied, "Well, there is a way to have an opportunity to live in a
facility.1 72 Most importantly, Gohmert's colloquy misses Jawetz's point.
Jawetz testified that he had taken a tour of the Willacy County Detention
Center operated by Management and Training Corporation ("MTC") and
noted substandard housing conditions, but could not use the Freedom of
Information Act to access MTC's records pertaining to maintenance of the
housing units because the records were not held by a federal agency.173
While cases such as the de la Rosa murder show that serious operating
failures can be addressed by courts, in reality inmate access to courts is
curtailed by judicial doctrine and the PLRA. 174 In addition, interested
parties outside the prison system typically do not have standing to challenge
prison operations in court. 175 Thus, many legitimate concerns that do not
involve the loss of life or limb must be raised with non-judicial oversight
bodies, usually legislatures. When prison operators are able to diffuse
legislative attention by arguing that the only appropriate remedy is through
contract procedures or renegotiation (which are less public processes than
legislation), the state's control of its carceral apparatus is diminished.
On a more practical level, outsourcing is an effective way for
governments to evade numerous generally applicable accountability
measures. The most prominent such evasion in the realm of federal
correctional outsourcing has been avoidance of environmental planning
laws. As a general rule, contractors are subject to the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") when constructing a prison destined
for use under a federal contract. 17 6 The federal government's recent habit of
169. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
170. Private Prison Information Act of 2007 (Part II): Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 190 (2008), at 65
(testimony of Tom Jawetz, Immigration Det. Staff Attorney, Am Civil Liberties Union Nat'l Prison
Project) [hereafter H.R. 1889 Part II Hearing].
171. Id.
172. Id. at 66.
173. Id. at 56.
174. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1986).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2006).
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contracting with pre-existing facilities avoids the meaningful application of
NEPA since there is no federal nexus at the time of construction. 177 The
interest of contractors and the federal government in avoiding NEPA is
more than theoretical. Federal courts have held that one purpose of NEPA
is to ensure public participation in the planning process-a goal in direct
conflict with prison-planners' objective of "managing" public opposition. 178
While private prison companies' non-governmental status can be
exploited in numerous ways, two particularly salient areas are considered in
the following sections. First is a discussion of contractor liability for
violations of inmates' civil rights. Second is an exploration of the problems
concerning public access to information regarding private prison operations.
A. Liability
Questions of liability largely center around allocating the risk for
contractor violations of inmate civil rights. In the early stages of the
twentieth century prison privatization movement, many issues of contractor
liability implicated unsettled areas of the law. In 1988, the Supreme Court
issued its first ruling addressing the liability of contractors in the prison
system.1 79 In West v. Atkins, the Court held that a contract physician
performing work in a state prison system acted under color of state law and
was thus amenable to suit under section 1983 for alleged violations of an
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. 180 This rule has subsequently been
applied several times to allow section 1983 suits against private prison
operators.181 The West holding provided some encouragement to prisoner
177. See, e.g., City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 1975); Citizens Alert
Regarding the Env't v. EPA, 259 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the possibility of
future federal funding of a project is not sufficient to make NEPA applicable).
178. E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir. 1983); Envtl.
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Staumm, 430 F. Supp. 664, 667 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Citizens Against Toxic Sprays,
Inc. v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 922 (D. Or. 1977); NAT'L. INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AN INFORMATION BRIEF: ISSUES IN SITING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES iv (1992) ("We must learn better
ways to manage public opposition because we can expect that the future will hold more, not fewer,
decisions about where to locate correctional facilities.").
179. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).
180. Id. ("Respondent, as a physician employed by North Carolina to provide medical services to state
prison inmates, acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in
treating petitioner's injury. Such conduct is fairly attributable to the State.").
181. E.g., Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(holding that a corporation operating a prison under a contract with Texas was performing a public
function and thus was subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment); Cornish v. Corr. Servs.
Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550-51 (5th Cir. 2005) (implying approval of defendant prison corporation's
concession that it acts under color of state law when providing juvenile correctional services, but
holding that defendant was not a state actor when making personnel decisions). But see Richardson v.
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (declining to rule on whether a private prison corporation was
acting under color of state law for purposes of a prisoner's section 1983 suit); George v. Pac.-CSC Work
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rights advocates, since section 1983 is an important mechanism for
vindicating inmates' constitutional rights. Because a section 1983 action
may only be brought against a person acting under color of state law, 182 the
West holding was a necessary step in clarifying the applicability of
sectionl983 to private contractors in a correctional system.
Once the Court had established the applicability of section 1983 to
corrections contractors, the next major question was whether a contractor
was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. 183 The Supreme Court
addressed this question in Richardson v. McKnight and held that prison
guards employed by CCA could not raise a qualified immunity defense
against a prisoner's section 1983 suit for personal injuries. 184 Although
Richardson increased the potential accountability of private prison
operators, its enduring effect is somewhat uncertain for two reasons. First,
the Court's holding relied at least in part on a finding that CCA's operations
were not heavily supervised by the State.185 Thus, it is unclear whether the
same result would follow in a state with a more aggressive monitoring
program. Second, four justices (three of whom are still on the Court)
dissented from the Richardson holding, citing both legal and policy
objections. 186
Today's confused jurisprudence regarding section 1983 and private
prisons raises important fiscal questions. The government-supervision
factor articulated in Richardson presents an uncertain relationship with
vicarious liability in the context of section 1983.187 It is settled law that the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to section 1983 actions. 188
Accordingly, a prisoner bringing a section 1983 claim against corrections
Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) ("An entity may be a state actor for some purposes but not
for others.").
182. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,49-50 (1999).
183. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) ("The conception animating the qualified
immunity doctrine .. .is that 'where an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly
established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken with
independence and without fear of consequences."' (internal citation omitted) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982))).
184. 521 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1997).
185. Id. at 409 ("The firm is systematically organized to perform a major administrative task for profit.
It performs that task independently, with relatively less ongoing direct state supervision." (internal
citations omitted)).
186. Id. at 414, 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision says that two sets of prison guards
who are indistinguishable in the ultimate source of their authority over prisoners ... are to be treated
quite differently in the matter of their financial liability. The only sure effect of today's decision-and
the only purpose, as far as I can tell-is that it will artificially raise the cost of privatizing prisons ....
Neither our precedent, nor the historical foundations of § 1983, nor the policies underlying § 1983,
support this result.").
187. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
188. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
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officials must prove that the defendants had personal involvement in the
alleged deprivation of rights. 189  But courts have not specified how
Richardson's supervision factor interfaces with the respondeat superior
doctrine. In other words, if state supervision is not sufficient to allow a
contractor to raise a qualified immunity defense, might a state monitoring
employee nonetheless have enough personal involvement in a deprivation
of rights to impose liability? The outcome is fiscally important, since most
government agencies voluntarily indemnify employees against sectionl983
judgments. Thus, if a contractor and government supervisor can both be
held liable, the government may have to pay the employee's judgment
(through indemnification) and the contractor's judgment (by means of
passed-through costs in future rate adjustments).
Ultimately, the application of section1983 to private prisons presents a
policy paradox. If private operators are more susceptible to liability than
their state counterparts (under continued adherence to Richardson), then the
increased costs will presumably be passed on to contracting agencies, thus
raising the fiscal burden of privatization. On the other hand, if the courts
equalize treatment of public and private prisons, contractors will have
reduced incentive to improve conditions (and correspondingly reduce profit
margins) in an effort to avoid section 1983 liability.
B. Public Access to Information
Another problematic aspect of prison privatization is the extent to which
outsourcing obscures public understanding of prison operations. At the
same time private prison operators defend their track record, they obstruct
evidence-based counterarguments by shielding important operating
information from public disclosure.1 90 As a general matter, federal and state
statutes mandating disclosure of government records frequently provide
protections for information relating to contractor activities-either through
express disclosure exemptions for trade secrets or judicial doctrines holding
disclosure laws inapplicable to records in possession of a contractor. 191
These protections are often based on the premise that contractors provide
specialized services to the government as part of a larger business model. 192
189. See, e.g., Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1114 (D.S.D. 2007) (denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment because alleged involvement of the Warden and Corrections Department
Secretary in programming decision raised material issue of fact).
190. See Melanie Bengston, Legislation, Lawsuits Seek to Shine Light on Private Prisons, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS, July 21, 2008,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/(S(btvxax45gubnpb55vkwsfq45))/191 displayNews.aspx (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
191. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006).
192. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Guide: Exemption 4 (May 2004),
2010]
For example, if a hypothetical aviation manufacturer, AirCo, was forced to
disclose information about its design process simply because it sold planes
to the government, the company would risk revealing trade secrets and
would be at a competitive disadvantage solely because the government
happened to be among its customers. Such disclosure would not only harm
AirCo, but this disadvantage would distort the entire market, thus imposing
spill-over effects on all participants. This logic does not apply easily in the
realm of private prisons.
Governments are the only customers of private prison operators. Thus,
the only private parties harmed by mandated disclosure are the contractors
themselves. Moreover, there are no substantial trade secrets in the private
prison industry. A trade secret can consist of "any information that can be
used in the operation of a business.., that is sufficiently valuable and secret
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." 193
However, the term most commonly applies to formulas, patterns, data
compilations, computer programs, devices, methods, techniques, or
processes. 194 Although private prison operators likely employ methods and
processes in the conduct of their business (e.g., operating procedures and
educational programs), such information is only entitled to trade secret
protection if it is valuable, secret, and definite. 195 Notably, information
does not qualify as a trade secret if it is "generally known or readily
ascertainable through proper means... by others to whom it has potential
economic value... ."196
The ill fit between trade secrets law and private prisons can be illustrated
through an example. Private prison operators typically assert a proprietary
interest in facility staffing plans. 197 Case law is not entirely clear whether
such information is eligible for trade secret protection as a matter of law. 198
But assuming for purposes of argument that government contractors'
http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption4.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1993).
194. See id. § 39 cmt. d.
195. See id.
196. Id. § 39 cmt. f.
197. See, e.g., Aff. of Ron Maddux, Vice President Project Dev., GEO Group, Inc. (Mar. 20, 2009) (on
file with author) (requesting that the Florida Department of Management Services invoke trade secret
exemption from disclosure of the following documents submitted as part of GEO's response to
Invitation to Negotiate DMS 08/09-077 (Operation and Management of South Bay Correctional
Facility): federal facility performance review reports; unannounced security audit reports; letters of
reference; lists of contract values and per diem information for existing contracts; listings of previous
lawsuits, prior contracts, and facility disturbances; facility staffing requirements; job descriptions; and
lists of salary ranges).
198. E.g., E. T. Moye v. Eure, 204 S.E.2d 221, 223-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (indicating that list of
plaintiff's sales personnel does not qualify as trade secret); Finish Line, Inc. v. Foot Locker, Inc., No.
1:04CV877RLYWTL, 2006 WL 146633, at *8 (S.D. id. Jan. 18, 2006) (holding list of contact
information for plaintiff's district managers not eligible for trade secret protection).
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staffing plans are protected, the AirCo hypothetical again illustrates the
policy justification for such protection. A party concerned with the quality
of products being sold by AirCo to the government would not usually have
a need for AirCo's personnel data. Potential problems with AirCo's planes
can be determined by examining the product itself, and whether the plane is
manufactured by ten employees or a hundred employees is not material. In
the case of a privately operated prison, however, facility staffing is the
object of the government procurement. Thus, shielding such information
under a claim of trade secret protection unnecessarily hinders independent
evaluation of whether the government has received a fair bargain under the
contract. Moreover, without access to a contractor's proposed staffing plan,
interested parties have no way of knowing whether the supervising agency
is vigorously enforcing the terms of its contract.
To the extent that private prison operators do have a proprietary interest
in operational data, this private interest is almost always outweighed by
public disclosure, except in cases of bona fide sensitive security information
(e.g., facility architectural drawings). Scholarly research on the efficacy of
private prisons has been hampered by a lack of reliable data. To the extent
that such data is kept secret due to the inapplicability of public records
statutes to private contractors, policy-makers will never receive adequate
information to determine the operational success or failure of the prison
privatization experiment.
Access to federal records is governed by the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA").199 Commentators have long noted that FOTA raises serious
questions vis-A-vis private prison operators.200  Although FOIA
presumptively requires disclosure of records actually held by the
contracting agency,20 1 federal agencies that contract with private prisons
may receive summarized reports which misrepresent the underlying data.20 2
199. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
200. E.g., United Techns. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Group v. Marshall, 464 F. Supp. 845, 847-48
(1979) (finding that government contractor could not prevent defendant federal agency from releasing,
under FOIA, a mandatory annual statistical report the contractor had submitted to defendant pursuant to
procurement regulations); Malcolm Russell-Einhorn, Legal Issues Relevant to Private Prisons, in
DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., ABT Assocs. INC., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE app. 3, at 37-38 (1998).
201. Russell-Einhorn, supra note 200, at 37.
202. See, e.g., Getahn Ward & Bill Theobald, Ex-CCA Official: Puryear Misled Clients, TENNESSEAN
(Nashville), Mar. 14, 2008; Adam Zagorin, Scrutiny for a Bush Judicial Nominee, TIME.COM, Mar. 13,
2008, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1722065,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (reporting
allegations of Ronald Jones, a former CCA employee, who claimed he was required to manipulate
operational data so as to withhold damaging information from contracting agencies). Although CCA
issued a vehement denial, the company has never denied Jones' allegation that the company keeps
different sets of self-monitoring data, only some of which is made available to contracting agencies in
the ordinary course of business. See Corr. Corp. of Am., Letter to Customers (Form 8-K), Exhibit 99.1
(Mar. 17, 2008).
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When critical information is held by the contractor and not the supervising
agency, FOIA is likely not applicable. 2 3 Although no court has ruled on
this question in the context of private prisons, the District of Columbia
Circuit has held as a general matter that a government contractor (even one
exercising an adjudicatory function under "detailed government control") is
not an "agency" for purposes of FOIA.20 4
In 2007, Representative Tim Holden (D-PA) introduced House Bill
1889, which would have made FOIA applicable to entities operating prisons
under contract with the federal government. 2°5 The House Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security initially held a hearing on
House Bill 1889 on November 8, 2007, at which Representative Holden
cited problems with escapes and inmate assaults at CCA's Northeast Ohio
Correctional Center ("NOCC"). 2 6 Although the NOCC operated under
federal contract, CCA did not submit any operational reports to federal
agencies so there was no meaningful information accessible to FOIA
requesters. 27  According to Representative Holden's testimony, state
legislators and the media had been unsuccessful in obtaining information on
the problems occurring at the NOCC. 20 8 As Subcommittee Chairman
Bobby Scott (D-VA) later explained, House Bill 1889 appeared
uncontroversial at the time of the November 2007 hearing. 20 9 Soon after the
hearing, however, CCA contacted subcommittee staff "to express its strong
opposition to the legislation and question the necessity of the bill. '210
Due to CCA's opposition, Chairman Scott held a second hearing on June
26, 2008.211 Although CCA declined to testify at the hearing, it submitted a
written statement calling House Bill 1889 "a solution in search of a
problem. '212 In its statement, CCA claimed that government oversight is
sufficient to allay any problems with access to information and cited one
isolated example of a FOJA requester being able to obtain facility reports
from the contracting agency. 213 In addition to its own in-house lobbying
203. Russell-Einhom, supra note 200, at 37.
204. Wolfe v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
205. Private Prison Information Act of 2007, H.R. 1889, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
206. Private Prison Information Act of 2007 (Part I): Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 62 (2007), at 6
(testimony of Rep. Tim Holden).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. H.R. 1889 Part II Hearing, supra note 170, at 1 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1-2.
212. Id. at 3 (statement of Corr. Corp. of Am.).
213. Id. at 4. CCA's argument does not address the problem of contractors providing insufficient
information to the supervisory agency. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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efforts, CCA employed three lobbying firms in its fight against House Bill
1889.214 Moreover, the Reason Foundation (a conservative think-tank)
testified against House Bill 1889 at the 2008 hearing, and the U.S.
Department of Justice expressed concerns about the bill's potential costs. 215
The committee took no action on House Bill 1889.216
Of course FOIA is only part of the access to information debate, since
many private prison contracts are with state and local governments, thus
implicating state open records statutes.217 While state statutes generally do
not, on their face, apply to contractor records, some courts have recognized
the unique status of private entities which are the functional equivalents of
state agencies. 218
Not surprisingly, CCA also vocally opposes the application of state open
records law to private prison operators. In 2009, a Tennessee trial court
held that CCA was the functional equivalent of a state agency and was
required to fulfill a request for records under Tennessee's Public Records
Act.219 In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on Tennessee's
functional equivalency test, articulated in Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Cherokee Children & Family Services.220 Stating that privatization should
not act to curtail access to information on government operations, 221 the
Cherokee court established a four-factor test to determine functional
214. See Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Lobbying Report (2008) (reporting H.R. 1889 lobbying
on behalf of CCA) (on while with author); McBee Strategic Consulting, LLC, Lobbying Report (2008)
(reporting H.R. 1889 lobbying on behalf of CCA) (on while with author); Podesta Group, Inc., Lobbying
Report (2008) (reporting H.R. 1889 lobbying on behalf of CCA) (on while with author).
215. H.R. 1889 Part II Hearing, supra note 170, at 11-12 (testimony of Michael Flynn, Dir. of Gov't
Affairs, Reason Found.); Id. at 68-69 (Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., to Rep. Howard Coble, Member, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.).
216. See Govtrack.us, H.R. 1889: Private Prison Information Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hi 10-1889 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
217. See Scott D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, Growth and Quality of US. Private Prisons: Evidence from
a National Survey, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 427, 429 (2002).
218. E.g., State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 854 N.E.2d 193, 198-202 (Ohio 2006)
(holding that private entities that are functionally equivalent to state agencies are subject to Ohio's
Public Records Act but also concluding that a private non-profit organization operating a halfway house
did not meet the functional equivalency test). This does not, however, necessarily lead to the conclusion
that private prisons meet the functional equivalency test in all situations. George v. Pac.-CSC Work
Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3131610, at *1
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009).
220. Id. at *5 (citing Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67,
78-79 (Tenn. 2002)).
221. Cherokee Children & Family Servs, Inc., 87 S.W.3d at 77 ("Privatization may be desirable in
itself, but it should not come without.., leaving public accountability intact. Not only should the public
be able to monitor the private company's activities, but the monitoring should be on the same terms as
when the public agency was the information vendor." (quoting Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's
Right to Know: The Debate over Privatization and Access to Government Information under State Law,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825, 833 (2000))).
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equivalency. 222 The first, "cornerstone" factor is "whether and to what
extent the entity [e.g., a contractor] performs a governmental or public
function... ."223 The remaining three factors are the level of government
funding of the private entity, the extent of governmental control over the
entity, and whether the entity was created by legislative action.224
Although the trial court admitted the fourth Cherokee factor weighed
against a finding of functional equivalency, it found that the remaining
three factors all favored subjecting CCA to the Public Records Act.225 Not
surprisingly, CCA appealed the decision, advancing several counterintuitive
arguments. 226 For example, when addressing the first Cherokee factor (the
cornerstone governmental function test), CCA cited Tennessee's
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history of privately operated prisons as
grounds for concluding it does not perform a governmental function. 227
While CCA's argument is historically interesting, it disregards the last 150
years of changes in correctional administration and the relevant statutory
language. 228 Even more incredibly, CCA addressed the second Cherokee
factor (the level of government funding) by arguing it receives no funding
from the State of Tennessee. 229 Despite the fact that Cherokee itself
involved a private entity operating under a contract with the State, 230 CCA
argues that its revenue from the State constitutes payment for services, not
"funding." 231
Despite its efforts to overcome the Cherokee test, CCA did not persuade
the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In holding that CCA performs tasks
222. Id. at 79.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3131610, at *4-%
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009).
226. Id. at*1.
227. Brief of Appellant at 24-32, Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV,
2009 WL 3131610 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009) [hereinafter CCA Appellant Brief].
228. The Cherokee court explained the purpose of the first factor as "ensur[ing] that a governmental
agency cannot, intentionally or unintentionally, avoid its disclosure obligations under the Act by
contractually delegating its responsibilities to a private entity." Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Cherokee
Children & Family Servs, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 79 (Tenn. 2002). Accordingly, the focus of the analysis is
properly on the government agency's responsibilities at the time of contracting, not 150 years in the
past. Regardless of CCA's characterization of historical correctional practices, it is unquestioned that
the twenty-first century corrections system in Tennessee is the sole responsibility of government.
229. CCA Appellant Brief, supra note 227, at 32.
230. Cherokee Children & Family Servs, Inc., 87 S.W.3d at 79.
231. CCA Appellant Brief, supra note 227, at 32-36. CCA's position seems to misinterpret Cherokee,
which focused on the extent, not the nature of government funding. Cherokee Children & Family Servs,
Inc., 87 S.W.3d at 79. Cherokee held that Cherokee Children & Family Services met the government
funding factor because "over ninety-nine percent of its funding came from governmental sources." Id.
This standard presumably covers CCA, a company that candidly admits it is "dependent on government
appropriations." Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 21 (Feb. 25, 2009).
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functionally equivalent to the state, the court noted that "[w]ith all due
respect to CCA, this Court is at a loss as to how operating a state prison
could be considered anything less than a government function. '23 2
Nonetheless, although the court declared "without difficulty" that CCA falls
within Cherokee's functional equivalency test, 233 the practical impact of the
ruling remains in doubt for two reasons. First, although CCA operates
several facilities in Tennessee, only one is operated under a direct contract
with the State.234  Thus, the functional equivalency determination for
purposes of Tennessee's Public Records Act applies only to the South
Central Correctional Center.235  Second, the court's opinion interprets
Tennessee's prison privatization statute in such a way as to severely limit
the applicability of the holding.236 CCA contended that Tennessee's Private
Prison Contracting Act of 1986 ("PPCA") was the operative law for
purposes of information disclosure. 237 In particular, CCA argued that their
obligation to disclose information is limited to a narrow category of inmate
records.238 The Court of Appeals adopted CCA's position, stating that the
inmate records provision of the PPCA controls, rather than the more general
and expansive requirements of the Public Records Act.239 Thus, according
to the court's reasoning, imposing the entire Public Records Act on CCA
(via Cherokee) would render the PPCA's provision regarding inmate
records superfluous.240 Not only does this ruling sustain CCA's ability to
hinder public understanding of its operations in Tennessee, but the court's
method of statutory interpretation is questionable.
The court writes that the inmate records disclosure provision in the
PPCA must be interpreted in pari materia with the Public Records Act, so
as to give meaning to all parts of the respective statutes.241 The Public
Records Act applies only to records held by public entities "unless
otherwise provided by state law. '242 The court reasons that the PPCA is
232. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3131610, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009).
233. Id.
234. Id. at *7.
235. Id. at*7, 11.
236. Id. at *10.
237. CCA Appellant Brief, supra note 227, at 48-49.
238. Id. at 47; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-117 (2006) ("The records and other documents
concerning any inmate who is sentenced to the custody of the department of correction and is being
housed in a prison or facility operated by a private prison contractor shall be public records to the same
extent such records are public if an inmate is being housed in a department of correction facility.").
239. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3131610, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009).
240. Id.
241. Id. at *9 (quoting In re Estate of Nelson, No. W2006-00030-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 851265, at
*10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar 22, 2007)).
242. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) (2009).
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such a law that provides otherwise by limiting disclosure only to certain
inmate records. 243 The problem with this construction is that it ignores the
chronology of Tennessee law. The PPCA was enacted in 1986, sixteen
years before Cherokee was decided. 244 Thus, at the time of the PPCA's
enactment, CCA would clearly have been under no duty to disclose
information under the Public Records Act, and the inmate records provision
simply clarified the treatment of a certain category of records.
Moreover, the court's contention that the two statutes are in pari materia
is questionable from the outset. Typically, statutes are considered in pari
materia if they "have the same purpose or object. '245 In addition, "[t]he
rule of in pari matria is generally used when there is some doubt or
ambiguity in the wording of the statute under consideration. ' 246 Because
there is no ambiguity in either statute, nor are the two statutes inherently
contradictory, 247 the court's use of the PPCA to carve out an exception to
Cherokee is misguided. Given the lack of any preemptive language in the
PPCA's inmate records provision and given the general rule that statutes
regulating public affairs should be liberally construed in favor of public
disclosure, 248 Friedmann should be reconsidered by the Tennessee Supreme
Court.
The impact of reduced access to information is ubiquitous in the private
corrections industry. Private prison operators are exceedingly protective of
information regarding their operations, thus making informed analysis of
the policy successes (or failures) of correctional privatization difficult to
conduct. One recurring issue in this context is data on personnel
recruitment and retention.249 This is an area in which federal and state
contracts differ markedly. Federal contracts for private prisons are
generally covered by the provisions of the Service Contract Act of 1965,250
which requires contractors to pay wages at least equal to the local prevailing
wage for same job class.251 Thus, once a bidder identifies the location of its
proposed facility, the contracting agency provides the minimum wages, 252
243. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2008-01998-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3131610, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2009).
244. Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 932, § 1; Memphis Publ'g Co.
v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67 (Tenn. 2002).
245. 2B NoRMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
51:3 (7th ed. 2008).
246. Id.
247. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-117 (2006).
248. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 73:10 (6th ed. 2003).
249. See infra notes 250-65.
250. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (2006).
251. Id. § 351(a); see also 48 C.F.R. §§ 22.1000-22.1026 (2009) (implementing regulations).
252. E.g., Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Solicitation RFP-PCC-0015 ("CAR-11 RFP")
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and the contractor is able to incorporate those costs into its proposed price.
In stark contrast, state contracting procedures typically do not contain
comparable requirements, nor do most states require detailed wage
information as part of a bidder's proposal. For example, a CCA proposal
submitted to the Commonwealth of Virginia contained a seven-page "Plan
for Obtaining Qualified Workers," which consisted solely of
generalizations 25 3 and vague descriptions of personnel programs such as
"[u]se of employee development activities to promote positive employee
relations. ' 254  Thus, while the proposal is publicly accessible through
Virginia's open records statute, CCA controls access to the meaningful data
that would show the extent to which its performance is consistent with its
promises.
Compensation and other personnel information is of particular interest
when measuring the effectiveness of correctional privatization. Because
approximately sixty-five to seventy percent of a typical prison budget is
spent on labor, the key to a contractor's profit margin lies in controlling
personnel costs. 2 55 This is done either through reducing staff or reducing
compensation-an approach that the industry says it can do without
sacrificing quality of operations.2 56 But there is good reason to doubt the
private industry's claims because compensation effects staff turnover,
which in turn impacts facility safety.257 Industry-wide staff-turnover data
used to be included in a privately published statistical compendium and
reported annual staff turnover rates as high as fifty-three percent in the
private prison industry.2 58 More recent editions, however, do not contain
(June 12, 2008).
253. CORR. CORP. OF AM., VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PPEA PROPOSAL: DESIGN, BUILD,
FINANCE, AND OPERATE A MEDIUM SECURITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN CHARLOTTE COUNTY,
VIRGINIA 59 (Aug. 17, 2007) ("Methods of recruitment for vacant positions are designed to attract
qualified applicants from outside the organization, as well as within. The procedures will include, at a
minimum:
Recruitment strategies designed to attract qualified applicants from outside the organization;
Schedules and post assignments that include cross sex staffing; and
Establishing qualifications for applicants that permit experience to be substituted for education when
that experience is extensive and pertinent to the duties of the position.").
254. Id. at 60.
255. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 49, at 16.
256. Id.
257. E.g., CCCF AFTER ACTION REPORT, supra note 94, at 65 (concluding that "[hligh staff attrition
rate and inexperience has contributed to lack of ability to appropriately respond to emergencies"); see
also id. at 62 ("It became apparent to responding CDOC Investigators and the CDOC SORT ["Special
Operations Response Team"] Commander arriving on scene that a quicker and stronger response by the
facility security staff at the initial onset of the riot would have limited the extent of the riot.
Investigators believe that the lack of response was due to indecisive command level decision making or
inadequate staffing and resources, or both. The facility's command staff either could not or would not
deal with the situation at its inception.").
258. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., INC., THE 2000 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: PRIVATE PRISONS 101
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turnover data.259 The only reliable compensation data for private operators
is limited to high-level employees whose salaries and benefits must be
reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission.26°  While this
information does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of industry
compensation patterns, it does at least raise the question of where private
sector cost savings come from. In 2007, GEO/Wackenhut reported total
base salary and cash bonuses for five senior executives ranging from
$575,269 to $2.7 million (with a mean of $1.2 million).261 During the same
time, CCA paid base salaries and cash bonuses for seven senior executives
ranging from $353,550 to $1.7 million (with a mean of $765,406)-
although executives were also eligible for bonuses of up to 150 percent of
base salary.262 None of these figures includes stock options, deferred
compensation, or fringe benefits.263 In 2001 (the most recent year for which
data is available), the national average salary for a state corrections director
was $106,893, with no state paying over $150,000.264 During the same
year, CCA and GEO/Wackenhut had a mean senior executive cash
compensation of $458,492 and $576,900, respectively. 265
In addition to hindering research, contractor control of operational
information disadvantages local communities selected for new private
facility construction. The financial incentive for private operators to control
public relations is not merely theoretical-CCA and GEO/Wackenhut are
both candid about the risks posed by local opposition. 266 One apparent
strategy in private facility siting is to locate new prisons in economically
depressed rural communities.267 Despite mounting evidence that prisons are
(Camille Graham Camp & George Camp eds., 2000); cf Mark P. Couch, Private Prison Operator
Pitches Savings to State in Capitol Hearing, DENVER POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at B5 (reporting turnover of
"30 percent to 40 percent of its Colorado workforce a year" for CCA).
259. See CRUVIINAL JUSTICE INST., INC., THE 2002 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS
(Camille Graham Camp ed., 2002) [hereinafter 2002 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK].
260. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
261. GEO Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 21 (Apr. 3, 2008).
262. Corr. Corp. of Am., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 40 (Apr. 15, 2008).
263. See Corr. Corp. of Am., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 40 (Apr. 15, 2008); GEO
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 21 (Apr. 3, 2008).
264. 2002 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, supra note 259, at 150.
265. Corr. Corp. of Am., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 18 (Apr. 16, 2002); GEO
Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 10 (Apr. 1, 2002).
266. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 24 (Feb. 27, 2008) ("Our success in obtaining
new awards and contracts sometimes depends, in part, upon our ability to locate land that can be leased
or acquired, on economically favorable terms .... When we select the intended project site, we attempt
to conduct business in communities where local leaders and residents generally support the
establishment of a privatized correctional or detention facility."); GEO Group, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 23 (Feb. 15, 2008) (providing a similar description of siting risks).
267. E.g., Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 24 (Feb. 27, 2008) ("Some locations may
be in or near populous areas and, therefore, may generate legal action or other forms of opposition from
residents in areas surrounding a proposed site."); GEO Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23
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not good economic development tools, 268 prison developers often sway
local opinion leaders by promising robust payrolls and large property tax
payments.
Although academic researchers have produced sound evidence
questioning the economic development aspects of prisons, 269 such studies-
written in the jargon of peer-reviewed journals and frequently using fairly
abstract variables as indicators of economic impact-are often ineffective in
influencing public opinion. Without access to reliable and salient data on
private prison compensation, it is difficult for potential host communities to
make an informed decision on a proposed private prison, although
anecdotal evidence often suggests promises of high-paying jobs are
overreaching. 270  Notably, private prison operators-particularly CCA-
have recently increased their public relations efforts related to facility
siting. In early 2008, CCA launched a specialized website based on the
marketing slogan "Caring for Our Communities. Serving Our
Neighbors. '271 Although the site contains little hard data, it inundates users
with repetitive claims of healthy economic development, typically couched
in generalized platitudes.272 While CCA has become increasingly adept at
(Feb. 15, 2008) ("Otherwise desirable locations may be in or near populated areas and, therefore, may
generate legal action or other forms of opposition from residents in areas surrounding a proposed site.").
268. Terry L. Besser & Margaret M. Hanson, Development of Last Resort: The Impact of New State
Prisons on Small Town Economies in the United States, 35 J. COMMUNITY DEV. SOC'Y 1, 12-14 (2004);
Susan E. Blankenship & Ernest J. Yanarella, Prison Recruitment as a Policy Tool of Local Economic
Development: A Critical Evaluation, 7 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 183, 196-97 (2004); Ryan Scott King et
al., An Analysis of the Economics of Prison Siting in Rural Communities, 3 CRUVIINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 453, 477 (2004); David Shichor, Myths and Realities in Prison Siting, 38 CRUME & DELINQ. 70,
83-84 (1992); Douglas Clement, Big House on the Prairie, FEDGAZETTE (Minneapolis), Jan. 2002,
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapers/pub display.cfin?id=2048.
269. See supra note 268.
270. E.g., E-mail from Kindra Mulch, Dir. of Soc. Servs., Kit Carson County, Colo., to Linda Fairbaim,
Adm'r of Soc. Servs., Prowers County, Colorado (Aug. 15, 2003, 15:24 MST) (on file with author) ("I
would tell you that the average salary paid @ our prison [CCA's Kit Carson Correctional Center]
qualifies most people for WIC, Family Planning and Child Health Plan Plus, and in a few cases a small
food stamp and child care allotment.").
271. Corr. Corp. of Am., CCA Community, http://www.ccacommunities.com (last visited Jan. 15,
2010).
272. E.g., Economic Development, Loc. COMMUNITY ECON. DEV. NEWS (Corr. Corp. of Am.), May 25,
2007, at 1-2, available at http://www.ccaconimunities.com/static/assets/EconDevTabloid_5.25.07.pdf.
This is a newsletter apparently designed for distribution in communities selected for new CCA
development. See id The newsletter consists mostly of vague statements such as "[hlosting a CCA
correctional institution can potentially mean hundreds ofjobs with an annual payroll in the millions" and
"CCA provides competitive salaries, job training that leads the industry, and excellent opportunities for
rapid advancement nationwide." Id The newsletter also states, "CCA pays applicable property taxes on
the facilities it owns." Id. at 1. This is a cleverly-worded half-truth, since it refers only to "applicable"
property taxes and does not address the numerous situations in which CCA has negotiated tax
abatements with local economic development authorities. MATTERA ET AL., supra note 78, at 28-46.
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using strategic marketing to frame such generalizations in compelling and
aesthetically pleasing media, it has simultaneously prevented dissemination
of the hard data that could prove or disprove the company's claims.273
CCA's most common response is that operational data is available to
contracting agencies. 274 Setting aside the issue of whether agency monitors
receive accurate and complete data, this argument still misconstrues the
purpose of public information laws. Because corrections departments so
often depend on private prisons to provide needed bed space, agency staff is
not necessarily motivated to request information such as compensation
data.275 Public records laws are designed to counteract agency hesitancy by
allowing interested parties to independently analyze government
operations. 276 Without articulating a compelling justification for secrecy,
prison operators have been largely successful in their efforts to prevent or
hinder release of salient operating information.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of United States correctional policy is decidedly cyclical.
Reforms are followed by dissatisfaction, followed by inaction, followed by
more reforms.277 Historically, most prison reform movements have been
motivated, at least initially, by ideals of rehabilitation and society's
responsibilities to wayward individuals.278  Twentieth century private
prisons can be viewed as a reform movement, but the motivations were not
benevolent. Rather, the primary objective underlying the modem private
prison industry was rapid expansion of the nation's prison system. 27 9
Private prisons delivered on the promise of quick expansion, but carceral
growth came at a cost. Most obviously, states are now struggling under the
fiscal impact of large prison populations.280
The only objective operational data contained in the entire eight-page newsletter are nationwide totals of
inmates and employees. See Economic Development, Loc. COMMUNITY ECON. DEV. NEWS (Corr. Corp.
of Am.), May 25, 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.ccacommunities.com/static/assets/EconDev Tabloid 5.25.07.pdf.
273. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
275. See MATTERA ET AL., supra note 78, at 46.
276. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra Part II.
279. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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While private prison operators relentlessly claim that their services are
beneficial and efficient, they prevent public access to information which
could substantiate or refute these claims.28 1 Meanwhile, many contracting
agencies have little interest in seriously analyzing the efficacy of
privatization because they are dependent on contractor-owned
infrastructure. 282 In the early days of contemporary prison privatization,
states had some bargaining leverage since prison operators were fledgling
entities that would be financially harmed by contract cancellation. But the
end of the twentieth century witnessed the explosive growth of the secretive
and lucrative immigrant detention sector.283 Along with other components
of the national prison-bed market, immigrant detention has changed the
landscape of prison outsourcing. States that depend on privately owned
prison capacity are increasingly vulnerable, as prison operators can now
shop for customers.
Certainly, as states begin to reduce prison populations through
sentencing changes and other policy reforms,218 4 they should prioritize the
withdrawal of inmates from private facilities. But such a process could be
exceedingly difficult. After a certain number of contract terminations,
private operators-saddled with large amounts of corporate debt-will
destabilize with potentially catastrophic results for those states still
dependent on private facilities. Such a process would combine the
complexity of the nation's current financial crisis with the difficult and
dangerous arena of criminal justice administration.
Since the federal government is largely responsible for the emergence of
the national prison market,2185 it must provide the solution to the nation's
current private prison problem. A federal solution must begin with
immigration policy, which has been the primary driver behind the private
prison industry in recent years. But immigrant detention policy cannot be
addressed in a vacuum. Although a rapid draw-down in immigrant
detention populations is desirable from a practical and humanitarian
perspective, it would likely wreak havoc on the private prison industry. If
the industry destabilizes, state correctional systems would be beset by
uncertainty and many local governments would be forced to service debt on
empty detention facilities. Accordingly, immigration policy reform must be
integrated with a specific "private prison fix." There are many potential
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policy approaches. The federal government could provide funding for
states to acquire private facilities (hopefully tied to prison population
reduction goals). Alternatively, Congress could develop a specialized
bankruptcy or receivership process for the industry. Yet another possibility
is a federal "deprivatization" process, modeled after the creation of Amtrak.
Whatever specific form the federal response to the private prison
industry takes, now is the ideal time to undertake the challenge. President
Obama recently issued a memorandum instructing all federal agencies to
thoroughly reexamine outsourcing practices and procedures. 28 6  The
directive emphasizes the need to appropriately monitor contractors and
ensure that the federal government maximizes value. 287 When applying this
process to prison contracting, federal agencies would be well-advised to
take a broad, inter-governmental view of the problem. If the federal
government extricates itself from the private prison industry (as it should),
the negative impacts will be felt by the states.
Massive prison growth in the late twentieth century is a social
experiment that has failed. Embedded in this experience is the subsidiary
privatization experiment. Due to government reliance on private capacity
and complex financial engineering, winding down the industry will be
challenging. Nonetheless, the track record of private corrections shows that
it is a challenge that must be undertaken.
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